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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of economic integration 
on intra EU FDI. More specifically, a model is employed regressing country 
relative intensities of inward FDI originated from within the EU against a 
set of variables expected to affect the FDI inter-country distribution. Trade 
appears to be a significant and positive factor mobilizing intra regional in-
ward FDI in almost all cases. The next important determinants of intra EU 
FDI are supply cost variables.  Capital productivity and development level 
considerations seem to have played a minor role in determining patterns of 
intra-EU FDI. 
JEL classification: F15, F21, F23. 
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1. Introduction 
The emergence of a single market in the European Union (EU) is ex-
pected to have contributed to the growth of trade and investment, between 
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the countries of the Union. Economic integration is supposed to have set in 
motion a process of convergence and/or divergence within the EU, which 
either balances or amplifies inter member country differences related with 
supply side conditions, e.g. wages, interest rates, external economies, etc., 
and economic policies, and through them to influence intra-regional foreign 
direct investment (FDI) flows. 
There is considerable theoretical and empirical research on the relation-
ship between the Single Market and FDI into the EU. Clegg (1998) suggests 
that the growth of intra-EU FDI is linked to the adoption of a pan-European 
FDI strategy by EU firms, largely prompted by EU market integration. Neary 
(2002) extends the theory of multinational corporations identifying distinct 
influences of internal trade liberalization by a group of countries on the level 
and pattern of inward FDI. There are also other studies concerned with eco-
nomic integration and FDI  (Balasubramanyam, Sapsford & Griffins, 2002; 
Neven & Siotis, 1996; Pain & Lansbury, 1997). The aim of this paper is to 
examine the impact of economic integration on intra EU FDI. More specifi-
cally, a model is employed regressing country relative intensities of inward 
FDI originated from within the EU against a set of variables expected to af-
fect the FDI inter-country distribution. 
Economic theory suggests that the abolition of tariffs and other trade bar-
riers between two or more countries raises the bilateral or regional trade vol-
ume (Viner, 1950). Enhanced trade would partly substitute defensive FDI 
sourced in the member countries of the customs union and motivated by a 
strategy of penetrating protected national markets, especially large ones (for 
an analysis of the exporting vs. local production in the presence of tariffs see 
Horst, 1973 and Hirsch, 1976). As opposed to that, efficiency seeking FDI 
(for the categorization of FDI see Narula, 1996) is possible to expand. An 
emerging single market increases competition, and economies of scale and 
scope through liberalizing both the access of firms to the constituent national 
markets and the mobility of production factors. Therefore, it rises the scope 
for production rationalization (Cantwell, 1988; UNCTC, 1990) and the build-
ing of a regionally integrated network of affiliated firms under common 
ownership that locate production phases or the manufacturing of different 
varieties of the same product according to local supply conditions.  Such a 
production network would take advantages from free intra-firm trade, lower 
cross border coordination costs effected through the inter-country conver-
gence of institutions, policies, attitudes, codes of behavior and the deregula-
tion of market transactions, and finally of economies of scale through mar-
keting to an enlarged regional market.  
A liberalized single market through free trade and access to factor, prod-
uct and services market may also favour strategic asset seeking FDI, which 
tries to get access to skills, technologies, R&D facilities and other intangible 
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resources, most of which are country and firm idiosyncratic in nature and 
subject to culture, institutions and agglomeration economies. In addition, a 
unified single regional market may facilitate the transfer across national 
boundaries of intangible firm specific income and market power generating 
resources, such as brand names, managerial expertise and other non-codified 
information intensive assets, for which market failure is high. Therefore, full 
economic rents may better be extracted via common ownership, viz. FDI 
rather than licensing or other arm’s length transactions (see the internaliza-
tion theory of FDI, indicatively Buckley and Casson, 1976; Rugman, 
1980,1985; Dunning 1981; Hennart, 1982). 
2. Towards building a model: Hypotheses and variables 
The creation of a single regional market may result to intensified trade 
between the member countries. That means that the share of intra-regional 
trade to total international trade of the region (intra plus extra regional trade) 
would increase. In this context the relative volume of intra-regional trade 
may approximate the degree of completing the single regional market and an 
increasing share may indicate an increasing integration of the individual na-
tional markets of the region. In turn, the deepening of regional integration is 
expected to promote a regional in scope business and investment strategy of 
firms advancing the motives for both the efficiency and strategic seeking 
FDI. It is also expected that a single regional market nullify the motives for 
defensive FDI. However, this is rather a once and for all effect occurring in 
the initial stage of building a unified regional market. In this respect the 
overall effect is assumed to be rather positive, especially because in the EU 
case a customs union preceded the single market program, thus any substitu-
tion effect should have been exhausted well before 1985, when the single 
market program was launched. Therefore, the hypothesis may be formulated 
as it follows:  
H1: A member country’s further integration with the EU’s single mar-
ket, as it is approximated by the ratio of this country’s intra EU exports 
plus imports over its total (intra plus extra EU) exports and imports, is 
assumed to have a positive effect on the country’s inward FDI originated 
in the EU. 
The unification of the EU’s internal market spurs competition across the 
enlarged market, thus triggering industrial restructuring according to national 
competitive advantages, as they are manifested in supply conditions. With 
free mobility of production factors and inputs value added activities would 
locate in the most cost efficient sites, according to the nature of each activity. 
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That may create clusters of similar activities located in specific or neighbor-
ing areas. Such clustering may give rise to agglomeration economies the type 
of which differs across countries and sub-regions reinforcing the inflow of 
similar investments. In any case, inward FDI would depend on individual 
countries supply conditions, with countries having relatively more favorable 
supply conditions receiving higher proportions of inward FDI. Therefore, the 
formulation of the second hypothesis may be formulated as following:  
H2: The relative proportion of intra-regional FDI flowing into a member 
country would be increasing as the country’s supply conditions are be-
coming more advantageous relatively to these of other member coun-
tries.  
It is assumed that supply cost approximates supply conditions and in this 
context two measures are proposed for relative supply cost of a member 
country i at a time t: 
• Real unit labor cost in country i over the EU average real unit labor 
cost 
• Labor productivity in country i over the EU average labor productiv-
ity 
As the value of the second ratio increases so it does the relative cost ad-
vantage of a specific country within the EU, hence the expected sign is posi-
tive. On the contrary, as the value of the first ratio increases the relative cost 
advantage of an individual country tends to decrease, so the expected sign is 
negative.  
Economic theory predicts that in a unified regional market free capital 
mobility, the accompanied deregulation of individual country capital mar-
kets, and the harmonization of codes, procedures, and standards may result to 
the equalization of the marginal efficiency of capital prevailing in the con-
stituent national markets.  Investment would flow from countries of rela-
tively lower capital productivity to these with relatively higher one. Eco-
nomic theory suggests further that marginal efficiency of capital becomes 
equal to interest rates, which also tend to be equal between countries under a 
perfect capital mobility regime. In this context interest rates may be used as 
proxies for the marginal efficiency of capital, and to the extent that interest 
rates, hence marginal efficiencies of capital, differ between member coun-
tries, FDI would continue to flow from countries of low capital productivity 
to countries with a higher return on investments. The following index is pro-
posed to measure the degree of interest rate differentiation of a member 
country: 
Σi (Ri-REU)² 
Where: 
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Ri is the long term interest rate of country i.  
REU is the EU average long-term interest rate. 
An increasing value of the index reveals increasing divergence of the in-
terest rate of the country compared with other member countries. The hy-
pothesis may take the following form:  
H3: An increasing interest rate divergence of a member country from 
the union’s average may be interpreted as an increasing divergence of 
this country’s marginal efficiency of capital compared with that of other 
member countries. Hence, intra-regional FDI is expected to show an in-
creasing tendency to be directed towards this specific member country.  
Inter country differences in demand structures, as they are expressed by 
per capita income deviations from a region average, may induce FDI in mar-
keting intensive sectors in cases where more sophisticated structures are be-
ing created, or discourage FDI in cases where demand structures tend to 
downgrade. At the same time, per capita income differences may manifest 
differentiation of the development level between countries, hence different 
availability of resources, especially created ones, as well as different levels 
of agglomeration economies and business opportunities in each country. 
These differences as they are eliminated or pronounced by the advancement 
of a country’s development may benefit FDI motivated by the existence of 
resources complementary to firm specific ownership advantages. The ratio of 
GDP per capita of country i over the EU average GDP per capita may be 
used for measuring the relative development position of a country within the 
EU. The hypothesis may be formed as it follows: 
H4: As a member country advances its development level relatively to 
that of the others, intra-regional FDI would be increasingly motivated to 
flow intro this country.  
Finally, the dependent variable is the ratio of intra-EU FDI flowing into a 
member country over total intra EU inward FDI. An increasing ratio reveals 
an increasing tendency of intra EU FDI to concentrate in the specific member 
country.  
3. The model 
The model function can be summarized as it follows: 
FDI = F (YN, DI, L, W, XM, D1, D2, D3) 
Where: 
FDI = ratio of inward FDI coming from EU over total intra EU FDI. 
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YN = relative GDP per capita = GDPi over GDPEU  
GDPi = GDP per capita of country i 
GDPEU = EU average GDP per capita 
DI = Σi (Ri – REU)² = long term interest rate convergence-divergence index 
R = long term interest rate of country i (i=1…. 15) 
REU = EU average long term interest rate  
L = relative labor productivity =li over lEU 
li = labor productivity in country i 
lEU =EU average labor productivity 
W = relative labor cost = wi over wEU 
Wi = real unit labor cost in country i 
WEU  = EU average real unit labor cost 
XM = ratio of intra EU exports and imports over total exports and imports of 
country i. That variable represents trade integration in EU. 
D1 = dummy variable for the EU enlargement in 1986 (Spain and Portugal 
enter EU). 
The dummy takes the value of 0 prior to 1986 and the value of 1 after. 
D2 = dummy variable for the EU enlargement in 1996 (Austria, Sweden and 
Finland enter EU). The dummy takes the value of 0 prior to 1996 and the 
value of 1 after. 
D3 = dummy variable standing for the German unification in 1989.  The 
dummy takes the value of 0 prior to 1990 and the value of 1 after. 
4. Estimation methodology, data and results 
The log linear form of the equation presented in section 3 is estimated 
using OLS for each country separately with annual data for the period 1980-
2000. The equation has a log linear form because under this specification 
elasticities given by the estimated coefficients are constant. The equation is 
estimated for the following EU members: France, Germany, Italy, UK, 
Spain, Denmark, Ireland, Austria, Finland Belgium-Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands and Sweden. The model is not estimated for Portugal and Greece be-
cause of extensively missing data in the FDI series. 
The GDP per capita, long term interest rate, real unit labor cost, labor 
productivity and exports data have been sourced from Eurostat, while FDI 
data from the OECD FDI statistics. The results are presented in Table 1. 
The model is not performing at all in the cases of Germany, the Nether-
lands and Sweden. Therefore, the discussion of the results will focus on the 
other counties. The Durbin-Watson statistic indicates the presence of auto-
correlation in the cases of France, Spain, Denmark, Ireland, Belgium and 
Finland. The Cochrane-Orcutt technique was used for correction.  
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Trade appears to be a significant and positive factor mobilizing intra re-
gional inward FDI in all but Ireland cases. Internal EU trade has been proved 
complementary to intra regional FDI, and the opening of markets has facili-
tated the relocation of economic activity and the formation of production and 
marketing networks within the region.  
Supply cost considerations are significant determinants in the cases of It-
aly, the UK, Ireland, and Finland with the focus being on relative labor cost 
in the case of the UK, and in relative labor productivity in the case of Finland 
while both cost variables are significant in the cases of Italy and Ireland. The 
impact of supply conditions on intra-regional FDI is as expected.  
Relative development level is a statistically significant determinant in 
three cases, namely the UK, Belgium-Luxembourg and Denmark. In all cases 
it has the expected relationship with the dependent variable. 
Divergent marginal efficiency of capital seems to be a significant and 
positive factor influencing intra regional FDI in three cases, namely France, 
Spain and Austria.  
In the case of Austria its EU membership per se seems to have a positive 
impact on receiving FDI originating in other EU member countries. 
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5. Conclusion 
 In all performing cases but Ireland the formation of the single market, to 
a lesser or greater extent, appears to be the most powerful mobilizing factor 
of intra-regional FDI. The latter seems to complement intra-regional trade 
flows and in some cases to follow cost advantages of different locations. In 
the Irish case though, only supply cost factors seem to be the main determi-
nants of FDI flows coming from within the EU. Such considerations are ab-
sent in the case of Spain contrary to the belief that the relatively low labor 
cost in this country should have been one of the major attractions for foreign 
investment. In general, the free mobility of goods, services, and factors of 
production has benefited the majority of member countries in terms of at-
tracting increasing proportions of intra-regional FDI. 
Capital productivity considerations seem to have played a minor role in 
determining patterns of intra-EU FDI. This may be due to the fact that factors 
influencing the efficiency of capital are usually parts of the FDI package 
transferred across national boundaries. This transfer is even more frictionless 
in the framework of the single market. An even more minor role is attributed 
to development levels. Although there are differences in the per capita in-
come of the member countries these differences are not so acute as to create 
the need for major adaptations of marketing strategies and types of product. 
Demand structures are rather similar between the member countries and they 
do not represent major factors in determining the pattern of intra EU FDI. 
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